Current gang criminality at the port: This report has been tailored - made for investigators and designed to help DCI Analysis improve practice and enable detectives to more effectively respond to the port crime.
Gangs and criminality at the port is a highly complex and evolving area, that can often pose a threat to investigators or security operatives on the ground.
This assessment will help Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) improve on it's understanding of the current gangland activities at the Mombasa port and it's arteries at the Outerports, and offer sound advice on how to deal with corrupt port officials fueling organized crime scattering to the Outerports, and identifying suspects and witnesses.
Kilindini Oil Terminal Fuel siphoning syndicate
According to media reports, 'Tension has gripped Mombasa port after the Director of Criminal Investigations George Kinoti arrived to probe corruption.
A source privy to the investigations revealed that several top managers have been asked to surrender their official laptops for scrutiny.
The source also said the detectives are looking at the loopholes in port systems that enable goods to be smuggled through it.
Of top of concerns is the recent theft of petroleum at the Kilindini Oil Terminal.
Evidence Analysis Email Correspondences : Request CCTV CLIPS for KOT incident - Dated; February 22, 2019.
A Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) security operative tasked with Investigations sought CCTV clips of an incident reported in the morning of 21 February, 2019.
The operative sought access to CCTV footage of a spotted boat siphoning fuel at KOT. The Head of Security Services (HSS) blocked the request, cautioned integrated security system (ISS) system administrators, principal port security officers and their sabodinates from sharing CCTV footages related to fuel siphoning.
It is worth noting that the Petroleum Institute of East Africa (PIEA) said adulteration of petrol and Diesel with kerosene creates unfair competition for players engaged in legitimate trade, with the country losing sh 3bn because of tax evasion.
This would explain the disincentive to expose, and degrade what is a lucrative smuggling pipeline at the Mombasa port.
The unintended consequence of the policy directive issued by the Authority vis-a-vis section 42; Having a direct or indirect private interest in a decision and failing to declare the interest could be the likely point of interest to DCI to conduct threat hunts ..i.e;
OPSINT - Media Extract;
"Head of security (....) who was out of the county on official duty was moved to a non-existent post of head of ICT at the inland container depot in Nairobi. ICT department is locked in Mombasa.
Weekly Citizen has information that managers bitter with (...) rise colluded to link her to illegal oil business at the port involving (...) relative."
There's been complaints by the rank - and - file of increased cases of 'Favoritism or Discrimination', instances of employees giving or agreeing to give inducement or rewards inorder to show favour or discriminate including knowingly using or giving statements or documents that contain falsehood or misleading information to managment.
According to Weekly Citizen, the relative of the Head of Security is a 'Persons of Interest'. DCI could seek to establish whether the relative is associated with port gangs, detectives are looking at the loopholes in port systems that facilitate Illicit relationships.
Of top concern is the Corruption loopholes on human resource management, particularly in placement and deployment.
To disrupt illicit relationships, employees must be placed appropriately, movements within sections and out of station are required to be on merit.
The conduct of the relative is particularly significant, it offers a glimpse on how the patronage system directly feeds into port Corruption nexus Illicit trade
DCI ought to establish the linkage, whether the security operative was qualified to be a supervisor in the security establishment, or he is a benefitiary of 'capture' of the leadership of the apparatus.
In the likely senario that DCI invokes the 'Accountability Form', government introduced and operationalized through a circular - Ref No. OP/CAB 9/83A;
Which provides an avenue for Intelligence - led Operators to access information This would include;
National Intelligence Service (NIS) and Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) domicile inside the ports of entry to formally make request to the Lead Agency - 'Kenya Ports Authority ( KPA) and Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA)' to facilitate the agencies undertake their mandate.
Notably; Fuel siphoning at the Mombasa port is a structural problem, key actors in the Illicit market for Adulterated fuel a state servant's mandated to secure the port.
it comes as no surprise that the DCI detectives are looking at the loopholes in port systems that enable goods to be smuggled through it, the local police have been locked out as the probe continues.
'Rent seeking': KPA probed over hiring hundreds of security officers. In addition, some of the 'Persons of Interest' are benefitiaries of irregular recruitment that is subject of the EACC probe.
These include former senior port police officers who themselves were to be shuffled out of Mombasa port, but due to Cartel influence were recruited into senior managment positions in the port Security apparatus.
'LeakingPort Security apparatus fuels Illicit trade':The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) estimates about five million of the 33 million litres of kerosene consumed monthly in Kenya is utilised for lighting and cooking while balance is used for adulterating either diesel or petrol.
To go around ERC Audits, unscrupulous traders and agents siphon fuel from to the port, coniving with rogue port officials, with managements teams receiving, soliciting or agreeing to receive inducement or reward in order to influence the appointment of 'persons of interest' at the port, and as directed by cartels place the rogue officers in sensitive areas of the, to control securitye apparatus as 'gate keepers'.
A violation to Section 43, of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003.
'Port Intergrated Security System (ISS)': In the event of a risk that security minions reads the directive as a call to cover-up crime, and the same tempare with electronic evidence, delete CCTV records.
Intelligence - led Operators will hold the responsible Lead Agency criminaly liable, with offences ranging from the sabotage of Critical Infrastructure systems, and criminal conspiracy.
Section 45, of the Anti - Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003; Unlawfully interfering with the functions of a computer or any other electronic machinery so that it directly or indirectly results in loss of public revenue or in some negative effect on public revenue or any other public service, will most definitely be a great point of reference.
20 August 2019: Mombasa Port probe